

Thirty Years of Japan-China Relations^{*}

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Both Japan and China are important countries in East Asia, so the change of their relations has a great influence not only on themselves but also on peace and stability of East Asia and the world.

In this article, at first I am going to place the normalization of Japan-China relations 30 years ago in the modern history of their relations, and then to analyze characteristics of the joint Communiqué of 1972. Then I will review the 30 years of Japan-China relations from the viewpoint of how they feel toward each other. After that I will describe the present state of the relations of the two countries, and at last, try to suggest how to build better relations between Japan and China in the 21st century.

1. The Normalization of Japan-China relations

On September 29, 1972, in Beijing, Premiers Tanaka Kakuei [田中角栄] and Zhou Enlai [周恩来] signed the Japan-China Joint Communiqué [日中共同声明] that normalized the diplomatic relations between these two nations. It is needless to say that, until then, the relations had been abnormal.

Generally speaking, this abnormal relation is considered to be a product of the Cold War. Namely, after the Second World War, the victory of the Communist Revolution in China in 1949 caused the revision of the United States' initial policy for Japan that laid emphasis on demilitarization and democratization, and after that the United States tried to make Japan an anti-communist breakwater so as to contain the expansion of the influence of the victory of communist revolution in China. So in 1952 the United States forced Japan to recognize the Nationalist regime in Taiwan, headed by Jiang Jieshi [蒋介石], as the one and only le-

gitimate government and to ignore the newly established People's Republic of China. As a result, since then mainland China and Japan have had no diplomatic relations. Moreover, they remained in opposition for 20 years.

Zhou Enlai, in his welcoming address at a reception for Tanaka, stressed the history of invasions upon China caused by Japanese militarists since 1894, the beginning of the first Japan-China War [日清戦争]. A few days later, on October 3, he stated that since the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, the abnormal relations between China and Japan had lasted for seventy-seven years¹. But from the viewpoint of international law, we had better define the abnormal relations as that without diplomatic relations. At least until the Second Japan-China War [日中戦争] started, Japan and China have had inter-state formal relations. Even after the outbreak of the Lugouqiao (the Marco Polo Bridge) Incident [盧溝橋事件] on July 7, 1937, neither of the two countries dared sever diplomatic relations immediately. On January 16 of

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the following year Japanese Premier Konoe Fumimaro [近衛文麿] stated that hereafter Japan would take no notice of China. That meant, Japanese government denied the legitimacy of Nationalist government [国民政府] of China, both legally and politically. In 1940 Japan fabricated a puppet government of Wang Jingwei [汪精衛] in Nanjing and recognized this as a legitimate government of China. Queerly enough, Abe Nobuyuki [阿部信行] and his successors, who were dispatched to the puppet government as Japanese ambassadors from April 1940, are recorded on the list of Japanese diplomats to China without any notice at all compiled by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Japan even after the end of the Second World War². On the list of Chinese diplomats to Japan in MFA ed., "Chronology and Basic Documents on Japanese Foreign Relations 1840-1945", the last ambassador to Japan dispatched by Jiang Jieshi regime Xu Shiyong [許世英] is noticed as temporary return in January 1938, and in the next item Chu Minyi [褚民誼] of the puppet regime is recorded to arrive in April 1941, without any notice³.

As a natural conclusion, Japanese government even now considers it has consistently kept diplomatic ties with the Nationalist government of the Republic of China (ROC) [中華民國] and during the time of Japan-China War it just switched the object of recognition as the legitimate government of China from Jiang Jieshi regime to Wang Jingwei's puppet one. Such a position of Japan is one of the elements that have brought about serious controversy on historical issues with China. On this same list made by the MFA, puppet "Manchukuo" [滿洲国] is also recorded as an ordinary state. Although neither the legitimacy of "Manchukuo" nor of Wang Jingwei regime is recognized in the international society, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs still treats these puppet regimes as legitimate. Is it unfair

to conclude that the MFA even now would not admit Japan's historical mistakes?

After the end of the World War II, the communist revolution succeeded in China, and the Communists had taken the Nationalist's place. In October 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) [中華人民共和國] was founded. The former authority of the Nationalist government led by Jiang Jieshi fled to Taiwan, and there for a long time they have persisted their legitimacy as the one and only government of the whole of China. When Japan restored its independency in 1952, the world was already dominated by the cold war system, and Japan was put in the western camp and China eastern. Under such international circumstances, Japan following the Asian policy of the United States which controlled the western camp, recognized ROC government in Taiwan as the legitimate government of all China, and with it concluded the so called "Japan-China Peace Treaty" [日華平和條約], that is the Japan-Taiwan Treaty [日台條約]. Thenceforth Japan has adhered to such a fiction that the Nationalist regime, which actually controls only a small population of about ten million or so in Taiwan, is the sole legitimate government of the whole of China with a gigantic population of about a billion. In this way Japan denied the existence of the government of mainland China and such a situation has continued over twenty years. Then, since 1938 till 1972, the abnormal relations between Japan and China has lasted for thirty four years.

In the 1960s as China-Soviet Relations worsened, China left the eastern camp, and especially in 1968 a territorial dispute caused the armed clash between these two communist powers. China called the Soviet Union and its expansionistic policy as "social-imperialism" [社会帝国主义] and "hegemonism" [霸權主義], and deemed the Soviet Union as the most dangerous enemy both for China itself and for the

peace of the world. At that time, the United States, suffering from a deadlock of the Vietnam War, has become weakened to meet the Soviet Union. Therefore China and the United States, sharing their common enemy, the Soviet Union, became closer. For China the détente with the United States could conquer the difficulties which were brought about by its closed diplomacy during the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命]. In February, 1972 then US president Richard Nixon visited China. From then on, China and the United States, abandoning their former antagonism, have managed to improve their relations. In January, 1979 their relations were normalized at last.

2. The Japan-China Joint Communiqué

International circumstances surrounding China had a great change since the advance notice of Nixon's visit to China in July 1971. Soon after that, the government of the People's Republic of China was recognized to have the representation of the United Nations in October 1971. It would be impossible to realize the normalization of Japan-China relations without such a change of international relations. For Japan, it was quite unreasonable to keep ignoring the existence of China with which Japan had had a long historical exchange. Therefore, in Japan efforts had been made for a long time to eradicate such abnormal relations and build friendship with China, and this move was strengthening after much complications. Zhou Enlai is reported to have praised those in Japan who had devoted themselves for the Japan-China friendship movement, for example Takasaki Tatsunosuke [高崎達之助], Matsumura Kenzo [松村謙三], Ishibashi Tanzan [石橋湛山] and so on, citing the old Chinese proverb "Drinking water, never forget who dug the well [飲水不忘掘井的人]". This anecdote is very famous, and Sun Pinghua

[孫平化], who was also a Chinese 'digger of well', wrote in his book that Zhou Enlai emphatically pointed it out in his welcoming speech for Tanaka⁴. But we can not find it in the official record. Furukawa Mantaro wrote that Zhou mentioned it in the farewell party for Furui Yoshimi [古井喜実] who visited China in order to make a prior arrangement for Tanaka⁵.

Indeed, the role of the decision makers was overwhelmingly important. As the previous arrangements had opened the way for agreements, so Premier Tanaka dared visit China. But in the process of actual negotiation it was not easy to overcome the abnormal relations accumulated for long time between two nations, in fact Tanaka once gave up to reach agreement and even mentioned going back home⁶. So the Japan-China Joint Communiqué was completed by the strong eagerness to realize the normalization of both sides.

As mentioned before, it was true that Tanaka's visit to China was made possible by the precedence of Nixon. But although it took nearly seven years to normalize the China-US relations since Nixon's visit to China, Tanaka succeeded in the normalization at once. The United States, after the establishment of the PRC, had been the strongest supporter of the fiction that the Nationalist government of the ROC in Taiwan was the legitimate one of the whole China, and in order to secure it, had the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan government and stationed its armed forces there. Therefore there existed pro-Taiwan forces opposing the recognition of the PRC widely in the congress, the mass media and even the authority itself. So Nixon did not intend to realize the normalization directly. Dr. Kissinger told Zhou that the US-China normalization would be realized within two years of the second presidential term of Nixon⁷. Nixon was reelected in the end of 1972, however he lost presidency on account of the Watergate Incident, so Kissinger's

promise did not come true. Also in Japan there were unignorable pro-Taiwan factions especially in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) [自由民主党] in power both then and now, and in the business circles. So it could not be easy for Tanaka to rupture Taiwan and to establish relations with China. Here we can see his outstanding initiative comparing the other premiers in the post WWII Japan.

It can be said that for the normalization of Japan-China relations, the major obstacle resulted from the fact that Japan had had a so called peace treaty with China (in reality with Taiwan). For Japanese side, everything surrounding the last war with China, including Japan's compensation and the legal state of Taiwan, the former colony of Japan, had already been settled. Concerning Taiwan, Japan realized, having signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it had made a renunciation of Taiwan, and as a defeated nation it does not have right to mention to what country Taiwan belongs. So Japan could not agree with the Chinese claim that Taiwan should be a part of China.

On the contrary, it was essential for China, as the most damaged nation by the Japanese war of invasion, to make sure of declaring the end of war. And clinging to the 'one China' principle, China managed to persuade Japan to agree with the Chinese claim on Taiwan.

Tanaka made a speech in the welcoming reception held by Zhou Enlai, stating that "Our country made trouble for Chinese people". "Made trouble" [ご迷惑をおかけした] was translated into Chinese as "tian le mafan" [添了麻烦]. This caused not a small conflict. Chinese including Zhou thought that "tian le mafan" was such a light apology as one would make for splashing water on a someone's clothing, and so they strongly protested. But for Japanese side, such a translation was carefully selected, because there are a lot of members in the LDP who, maintaining that 'the Great East Asia

War' [大東亜戦争] was a defensive one, would not recognize it as a war of invasion. They had such a great influence that even Prime Minister Tanaka could not frankly admit the war responsibility of Japan to satisfy China. Foreign Minister of Japan Oohira Masayoashi [大平正芳] asked for the consent of his counterpart Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei [姬鹏飞] claiming that if a Japanese apology had been specified in the communiqué, the LDP would be split. So the Chinese side accepted the Japanese explanation, and refrained from pressing more. Therefore, in the preamble of the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, it is stated that "The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself⁸".

By the way, in the Japan-China negotiation, in order to reach an agreement as soon as possible, it was inevitable to leave some things unclear, such as war conclusion, war responsibility connected with Japanese compensation for individual war victims, and the Taiwan problem. As Zhou Enlai stated in his speech at a banquet held by Tanaka on September 28, it was necessary to "seek common ground on major issues while reserving differences on minor ones" in Chinese "求大同、存小異⁹", in Japanese "小異を残して大同を求め"。I may add that we Japanese have such a similar saying as "小異を捨てて大同に就く" that means "accept common ground on major issues while throwing away differences on minor ones". I don't know why there is such difference, though they surely have a common source. But I feel that what is interesting, is that the difference of characters between Japanese and Chinese was reflected. Let's get back to the question at issue. After that effective steps had to be taken to reduce "the minor", but they have not been successful. Consequently, differences did not decrease, but increased instead.

3. Thirty years of Japan-China relations

Since the normalization on September 29, 1972, Japan-China relations has changed a lot in various fields.

Chart 1 on page 24 shows the change of trade and of passengers' coming and going between Japan and China. The line graph shows total sum of export and import. We sometimes find ups and downs, but trend is expansion in all the fields, despite the fact that the Japanese economy has stayed stagnant for long time since 'bubble' broke. The total sum of trade was only 1.1 billion US dollars in 1972, but in 2002 reached 101.6 billion US dollars, showing an increase of over ninety times for thirty years. During that time the rate of increase of Japanese trade is less than fifteen times (that of Chinese trade is over eighty times in 2001). So one can easily understand how rapidly the Japan-China trade, especially for Japan, has expanded. Concerning trade, China and Japan have become extremely important for each other. In 2002 China occupied 13.5% of total sum of Japanese foreign trade, and ranks second next to the United States. Especially in Japan's import, in 2002 China stood on top of the world for the first time since the end of the WW II¹⁰. Japan is at the top of Chinese total trade.

Human exchange for business, studying and sightseeing etc., has remarkably developed.

The black bar graph in Chart 1 shows number of Chinese coming to Japan, and the gray one that of Japanese going to China. In 2001, the number of Chinese who entered Japan amounted to 444,441 persons, occupying 8.4% of the total sum, standing fourth next to Korea, Taiwan and the United States¹¹. The number of newly entering Chinese to Japan and that of Japanese leaving for China in recent years are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Every year the Cabinet Office [内閣府] of Japan, formerly the Agency of General Affairs [総務庁], have taken a public-opinion poll on foreign affairs since 1978. Chart 2 on page 25 shows the change of the percentage of those who have a feeling of familiarity with China. We can divide the 24 years from 1978 to 2001 into two periods. Until 1988, Japanese who felt a sense of closeness to China (hereafter, cited as 'pro-China'), constantly occupied over 60%, and the percentage reached the maximum, 78.6% in 1980. Those who did not feel so (hereafter cited as 'non pro-China') stayed at nearly a quarter. I call this period a time of honeymoon or a time of beautiful misunderstanding because of the following reason. In 1989 the percentage of 'pro-China' suddenly fell from 68.5% to 51.6%, and the difference between 'pro-China' and 'non pro-China' was reduced from 42.1% to only 8.5%. It is needless to say that such a violent worsening of Japanese feelings toward China

Table 1. Chinese newly entering to Japan

year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Number	283,467	299,573	327,005	385,296	444,441
Rate of increase		5.7%	9.2%	17.8%	15.4%

Table 2. Japanese leaving for China

year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Number	1,018,621	1,040,465	1,001,590	1,226,847	1,468,492
Rate of increase		2.1%	-3.7%	22.5%	19.7%

was caused by the Tian'anmen Incident [天安門事件]. However even before 1989, we already found not a few signs of intensification. A variety of problems of historical interpretation occurred in Japan such as the textbook controversy in 1982, the prime minister's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine [靖国神社] in 1983, controversial remarks made by cabinet members in 1986 and so on, which produced severe criticism by the Chinese and became political issues between the two countries. Such a situation was repeated several times where Chinese feelings toward Japan turned for the worse, so Japanese feelings in turn worsened toward China.

In 1992 the percentage of 'pro-China' was the highest since 1989, I cannot assert that it was brought about by the Japanese Emperor's visit to China, which was the first visit of successive Emperors of Japan to China. The percentage of 'pro-China' and that of 'non pro-China' became equal in 1995 and the next year at first the latter surpassed the former. In 1995 the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War was celebrated worldwide. Also in China not a few memorial events were held, and criticism of Japanese war responsibility was strengthened among Chinese people. In these years China repeated nuclear tests, ignoring protests from outside China, including people and government of Japan. On account of these elements the percentage of 'non pro-China' increased. Since then until now a gap between the percentage of 'pro-China' and that of 'non pro-China' has kept very small.

Apart from the Cabinet Office, a public opinion poll was taken jointly by the Asahi

Shimbun [朝日新聞] in Japan and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in China [中国社会科学院] in 1997 and 2002¹². Table 3 shows how Japanese see China and Chinese see Japan.

Table 3 shows 'pro-China' Japanese slightly exceeded 'non pro-China' in 2002. But according to more detailed result, as for Japanese female, 'non pro-China' (16%) surpasses 'pro-China' (13%). In all but the 35~59 year old age groups, 'pro-China' sentiments exceed 'non pro-China' sentiments. On the other hand, concerning Chinese feelings toward Japan, with the sole exception of the 50~59 year old age group, among those who 'Dislike' (45%) hardly reach majority, regardless of age, sex or residence, in every group 'Dislike' prevails. It can not be denied that Chinese 'dislike' Japan. In the age-groups of 60~69 and over 70 years old, 'non pro-China' sentiments occupy 60%. Especially, only 2% of over 70 year old 'like' Japan. The anti-Japan tendency of the generation of the War of Resistance Against Japan [抗日戦争] is remarkable.

From 1997 to 2002, the percentage of Japanese who 'dislike' China has kept around 20%. However those who 'like' China decreased from 30% to 20%, and those who neither 'like' nor 'dislike' Japan has increased. The Chinese who 'dislike' Japan have increased from one third in 1997 to over half in 2002. The Chinese who 'like' Japan did not change at all. So it can be said that in both Japan and China people's feelings toward the other party have not changed for the better, and in case of Chinese we can say worsened.

Professor Lu Yi [魯義], the head of the Institute of Japanology, Jilin University [吉林

Table 3. How Japanese and Chinese feel with the counterpart in 2002, () in 1997, %

	Like	Dislike	Hard to say	Others/No answer
Japanese	19(29)	17(19)	62(48)	2(4)
Chinese	10(10)	53(34)	35(51)	2(5)

大学日本研究所] at Changchun [長春] in Northeast district of China, analyzed this change. His conclusion is as follows. At the beginning of the normalization of Japan-China relations, the door which had separated two nations for long time was opened, and a fever of friendship dramatically broke out both in Japan and in China. Such emotional elements pushed up the percentage of 'pro-China' feelings in Japan, and at the same time 'pro-Japan'

in China. But after that, excitement cooled down and with the increase of exchange, either Japanese or Chinese have come to know each other better, and consequently have a more realistic way of looking at the other party. I almost fully agree with Professor Lu's analysis and this is why I call the time before 1989 that of beautiful misunderstanding.

According to the above-cited public opinion poll jointly taken by two nations, on the prob-

Table 4. What Japanese and Chinese regard the most important issues of Japan-China Relations. (2 choices) 2002

	Japanese	Chinese
Differences of political system	42	20
Economic friction	23	27
Military uneasiness	18	13
Criminal problems	12	4
Lack of mutual understandings	43	21
Historical interpretation	34	81
Others / No answer	7	5
Total	179	180

Table 5. Is Japanese war compensation sufficient? : %

	Japanese		Chinese	
	2002	1997	2002	1997
Sufficient	42	26	3	4
Insufficient	44	58	86	86
Others / No answer	14	16	11	10

Table 6. What should be done first? : %

	Japanese		Chinese	
	2002	1997	2002	1997
Wholehearted apology	13	17	41	28
Compensation of money	5	6	18	20
Fulfillment of history education	13	12	25	26
New Cooperation	67	61	14	20
Others / No answer	2	4	2	6

lems of Japan-China relations, perception gap between them is rather remarkable.

As Table 4 shows, Japanese attach almost the same importance to lack of mutual understanding and difference of political system as the most important issues, and history perception as the third. On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of Chinese regard historical interpretation as most important, and difference of political system as the second, with economic friction as the third.

Regarding Japanese compensation for the past, in 2002 42% of Japanese thought it sufficient, 44% insufficient, comparing to five years ago where 26% of Japanese thought sufficient, and 58% insufficient. So Japanese who thought their own war compensation insufficient doubled those who thought sufficient five years ago, and in 2002 the former still exceeded the latter; however the difference has become much smaller.

On the contrary, 86% of Chinese thought war compensation insufficient both in 1997 and in 2002. Chinese who thought sufficient occupy only 3% in 2002 (4% in 1997). I think it is very meaningful that the number of Japanese who think the compensation is sufficient have very much increased, but Chinese didn't change at all. Such a weak perception of Japanese on war responsibility easily leads to a Japanese feeling of disgust by the criticism from Chinese.

Concerning the history issue, what do Japanese and Chinese think should be done first? We are astonished to find how great the difference is! The feeling that a 'Wholehearted apology' is necessary has decreased since five years ago in Japan, but in China this feeling has made a big increase, exceeding 40%. We might imagine it reflects that there is increasing dissatisfaction among Chinese with Japanese attitude toward history issue. On the contrary, those supporting 'New Cooperation' has increased in Japan, decreased in China. It is

worthy of notice that in Japan even two thirds mention this in 2002. The percentage of those supporting 'Compensation of money' and 'Fulfillment of history education', little change has been made both in Japan and in China during five years. But comparing percentage in Japan with that in China, it is no more than half or one third. Generally speaking, we might conclude that Chinese, regarding Japanese regret for war of aggression insufficient, stick to history issue, and that in reverse the number of Japanese who attach greater importance to future relations, bringing the history issue to an end, has become more. And I think it regrettable that Chinese adherence to the history issue should make not a little Japanese away from China, and that Japanese indifference toward it should make Chinese feel hurt.

4. Japan-China relations of the 21st century

Besides the above issues, we have the Taiwan problem, China's intention to become a military power, Japan's desire to become an 'ordinary country' and economic friction resulting from the rapid economic growth of China, so Japan-China relations of today have huge problems to solve. As the population of Chinese grows in Japan, troubles with them increase and Japanese feelings toward Chinese are getting still worse. In China, following the rapid spread of internet, assertion of anti-Japanese feelings, as well as of patriotism, is remarkable. Therefore, Japan should seriously find ways to dissolve the distrust of Chinese.

Concerning the history problem, frankly speaking, I cannot help but express rather a pessimistic view. Just as mentioned before, the perception on war responsibility of most Japanese is very self-righteous. This was caused by the fact that immediately after the end of the WW II, almost all the Japanese felt that they were the victims of war, while only a few felt that they themselves had responsibility

to cause war and to injure the other nations. Those who admit war responsibility have increased, but they do not yet have power to change Japan fully to take war responsibility. So it will take long time for both Japanese and Chinese to have common understanding on modern history of Japan-China relations.

In the process of negotiation with North Korea, if Japan voluntarily apologizes for brutal colonial rule and propose compensation, the distrust not only of Koreans north and south, but also of all the Asians including Chinese, could be eased. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I must stress that the solution of kidnapping and nuclear development of North Korea should have priority for the moment. Nevertheless there is no reason to make little of Japanese responsibility for annexation of Korea and enslavement of Koreans.

And I do say that China should stop politically making use of the history issue. Until now China has often condemned Japan for its war responsibility. It is reasonable enough, but in fact the leaders of China, by doing so, instigated its people with nationalism in order to integrate them. And it is also true that whenever the historical issue happened between Japan and China, the solution was done monetarily and was called "economic collaboration". In November, 2002 the sixteenth national assembly of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was held, and Hu Jindao [胡锦涛], taking the place of Jiang Zemin [江泽民], was elected the Secretary General, the top leader of the CCP. Soon after that, an essay appeared in a Chinese magazine, which widely attracted attention in and out of China, because the author of the essay is an influential writer of the People's Daily [人民日報], an organ of the CCP. He asserted that Japan has already fully apologized and compensated for its invasion of China, and consequently, China should refrain from condemning Japan any more, and should look for

building a new partnership with Japan¹³. This essay is reported to reflect the Japan policy of the new leadership headed by Hu Jindao. It is said that they are anxious to get more economic aid from Japan, therefore they do not want the Sino-Japanese relations to be interrupted by the conflict caused by the historical interpretation¹⁴. If it is true, we can not deny that the historical issue is politically made use of by China.

China has long historical relation with Korea and, as they are both communist states, also has special relationship with North Korea. Previously China had great power over North Korea, but recently North Korea, setting up the flag of 'Juche Idea' [主体思想](Thought of Independence) has tried to exclude Chinese influence. Therefore today China has not so great influence over North Korea as it had before. However China is the sole country, except for international assistance, that supplies crude oil and food. Secretary General Kim Jong-Il [金正日], after succeeding his father Kim Il-Sung [金日成] to the 'throne' in 1994, has made four trips abroad, except to Russia, he visited China twice in 2000 and 2001. This shows that China still has limited influence the other countries have not. Therefore, in order to appeal to North Korea, it is the best way for Japan to join hands with China. But either China or Japan had better avoid playing too much remarkable role, because North Korea's feelings toward these two countries are very complicated. So the cooperation between Japan and China had better be demonstrated in multinational activity such as Tumen River [圖們江] Development Program etc.

Recently a lot of North Koreans flee to China for food and freedom and it causes international dispute. The Shenyang [瀋陽] Consulate-General affairs of May, 2002 is still fresh for us Japanese. In order to solve the affairs of refugees from North Korea, Japan and China


should cooperate also in international activities. It might be necessary to organize an international organ. To solve the Korea problem and promote regional cooperation in East Asia, the necessary collaboration of Japan with China is also increasing. Through the reinforcement of multinational cooperation, Japan-China relations can be improved and stabilized. By introducing the other actor to Japan-China relations, intending to relax the conflict between these two nations, such a manner can be expected to lead to solving the difficult problem, which can hardly be resolved through direct negotiation by two nations concerned solely. That is precisely the reason why a regional organization just like European Community is expected to be formed in Asia.

There is another hope to improve Japan-China relations. Just as Chart 3 shows, since

1978 — probably also before then — over two thirds of Japanese constantly have had a sense of closeness to the United States¹⁵. I think a considerable part of this resulted from Japanese young generation's admiration for American culture. Recently among young generation in China, admiration for Japanese culture including music, animated cartoons and TV games increased. So in future Chinese attitude toward Japan could change for better.


Two points are demanded of China. One is to observe its promise not to 'seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region' as stated in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué of 1972. The other is democratization. When it is developed in China, a lot of issues will be improved, although those connected with national interest cannot be easily resolved.

Chart 1. Trade and passengers' coming and going between Japan and China.




Source : 朝日新聞2002年10月2日 [The Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2002]

Chart 2. Japanese feelings for China



Source: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/y-index.html>

Chart 3. Japanese feelings for the United States



Source: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-gaikoku/images/zu01.gif>

- ¹ 中华人民共和国外交部外交史研究室编《周恩来外交活动大事记1949—1975》[Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China ed., *Chronicle of Diplomatic Activities of Zhou Enlai 1949—1975*. Beijing] 世界知识出版社, 1993年, 650页。
- ² (日本) 外務省編『日本外交年表並主要文書 1840—1945』[MFA ed., *Chronology and Basic Documents on Japanese Foreign Relations 1840-1945*. Tokyo] 下、国際連合協会、1955年、附表1、16-17頁。
- ³ 同前55—56頁。
- ⁴ 孙平华《中日友好随想录》[Sun Pinghua, *Essays on China-Japan Friendship*. Beijing] 世界知识出版社, 1986年, 107頁。
- ⁵ 古川万太郎『日中戦後関係史』[Furukawa Mantaro, *Postwar History of Japan-China Relations*. Tokyo] 原書房、1981年、387頁。
- ⁶ 毎日新聞政治部編『転換期の「安保」』[Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu ed., *Japan-US Security Treaty in Transition*. Tokyo] 毎日新聞社、1979年、251頁。
- ⁷ CIA Chronology, p.15, cited in James Mann. *ABOUT FACE a History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton*. Knopf. 1998.
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